SIRO/LAHSO remains a Canadian safety issue that threatens pilots on both sides of the border who fly in Canadian airspace.

Although ALPA lifted our recommendation for pilots to decline LAHSO in the United States, our recommendation to say "no" to SIRO/LAHSO clearances in Canada—for both U.S. and Canadian pilots—remains in full effect. The campaign will remain active until Transport Canada enacts sufficient regulations to ensure the safety of these operations.

According to critics of ALPA’s campaign, SIRO/LAHSO is safe. Transport Canada asserts that Canada has used SIRO/LAHSO for many years without serious incident. Some line pilots also have questioned the reasons for ALPA’s campaign. To clear up any misconceptions, let’s take a look at the myths and realities of SIRO/LAHSO.

Myth: SIRO/LAHSO has been flown in Canada for years without incident.

Fact: ALPA has identified a number of SIRO/LAHSO incidents—numerous dangerous encounters resulting from faulty judgement, misunderstood procedures, poor technique, and faulty communication.

Two such incidents involved an Airbus tangling with a privately operated Cessna, and a commercially operated ATR 42 tangling with a commercially operated Dash-8 in Halifax. When the Airbus pilot decided that he could not land safely against the Cessna, the Airbus pilot decided to attempt a go-around. The Cessna decided the same thing and got caught in either the Airbus’s jet wash or vortices. Whatever the cause of the Cessna upset, the incident was too close for comfort.

In the other incident, the air traffic controller issued first a SIRO/LAHSO clearance to the Dash-8 and then removed the restriction. The controller then tried to reapply the restriction and, when the Dash-8 captain refused to land and hold short, the controller tried to get the ATR 42 to go around. The ATR captain requested a land-long clearance, which was approved. The Dash-8 pilot reported a miss by only 10 feet to 15 feet at the intersection. This incident, like the Airbus/Cessna encounter, was too close for comfort, and unsafe!

Myth: SIRO/LAHSO has been studied and the current safety standards in Canada are acceptable.

Fact: Although SIRO/LAHSO has been studied through government-sponsored working groups, at no time has an effective operational risk assessment been performed on Canadian operations. Nevertheless, even these cursory studies identified certain minimum standards that must be in place before SIRO/LAHSO is safe.

During Transport Canada meetings in 1991 to establish SIRO/LAHSO procedures, a limitation on the tailwind component to no more than 3 knots was identified as necessary for safe SIRO/LAHSO on both wet and dry runways. This limit is published in the Aeronautical Information Publication Canada (AIP). The 3-knot limit was confirmed during recent SIRO/LAHSO Working Group meetings in September.

Current NAV CANADA practice is to allow SIRO/LAHSO above a 3-knot tailwind if the active pilot agrees with the conditions. This provision is contained in the NAV CANADA Manual of Operations, which most pilots never see. Pilots have been offered SIRO/LAHSO at Canadian airports with tailwinds in excess of 10 knots. In one case, a pilot was offered a SIRO/LAHSO clearance with a tailwind component of 17 knots. NAV CANADA has confirmed the 10-knot authority, and has been advised of the 17-knot occurrence.

Myth: SIRO/LAHSO airports are adhering to standard procedures detailed during various working group meetings.

Fact: Different airports apply different procedures in Canada. In many cases, airports have established agreements with specific carriers on SIRO/LAHSO. A pilot may have no knowledge of the details of these procedures and whether he/she may depend on a consistent standard being applied.

Standardization is the key to safe aircraft operations, and there is no SIRO/LAHSO standardization in Canada.

Myth: ATC will inform pilots if SIRO/LAHSO is being used by announcing it on the ATIS.

Fact: In many cases, pilots have been confronted with SIRO/LAHSO without warning. On occasion, pilots who questioned this have been told that the local procedure does not require an ATIS notice. In one case, at an airport that was not known to conduct SIRO/LAHSO, an ALPA pilot found himself in a passive SIRO/LAHSO role when he noticed another aircraft landing on an intersecting runway. When he asked ATC about the use of SIRO/LAHSO, the pilot was told that SIRO/LAHSO was always performed there.

Myth: SIRO/LAHSO is not a safety issue.

Fact: The risk indicators for SIRO/LAHSO have been increasing as the use of the operation increases.

Myth: Privately operated aircraft are not a problem since they can normally stop easily in the available runway.

Fact: Boundary Bay in British Columbia, a location to which ALPA carriers do not fly, has more SIRO/LAHSO incidents listed in the Transport Canada CADORS reporting system than any other airport. Most of these incidents reveal a lack of knowledge, a lack of technique, or a lack of focus on the need to stop the aircraft before the intersection.

Myth: In the event of a go-around, the pilot should follow the normal missed approach procedure.

Fact: We have no way of knowing if this will keep a pilot safe. If the land-and-hold-short aircraft decides to go around as well, where is the aircraft headed? In the Airbus incident, neither pilot knew what the other was going to do because there are no go-around procedures for SIRO/LAHSO.

One of ALPA’s professional staff in Canada recently challenged the manager of a Canadian airport to confirm that the aircraft would not collide if both SIRO/LAHSO aircraft went around. The manager could not do so because there was no procedure to ensure separation—no standardization.

Myth: Transport Canada is about to regulate SIRO/LAHSO in Canada.

Fact: The proposed regulation was withdrawn as a result of industry pressure. A subsequent working group reached little consensus on the need to establish minimum safety standards for SIRO/LAHSO.

In the meantime, SIRO/LAHSO is allowed on wet and dry runways in Canada. There has been no agreement on effective stop groups for available landing distance, particularly applied to the Dash-8 300, where the SIRO/LAHSO debate began about three years ago. NAV CANADA continues to authorize SIRO/LAHSO with tailwinds well above the 3-knot limit identified in AIP Canada. In a response to ALPA’s request for Transport Canada to regulate the agreed-to 3-knot tailwind component, the Association was advised that the government would not do so until the working group report was received. This effectively means that we do not know what limits are being applied to SIRO/LAHSO operations.

As the pilot participating passively in SIRO/LAHSO (on the full-length runway), you do not get a vote on whether the active pilot accepts SIRO/LAHSO with a 17-knot tailwind. You are just on the receiving end if something goes wrong.

What can you do?

The risk of SIRO/LAHSO is increasing as the use of the operations increases, which is why ALPA first identified SIRO/LAHSO as a serious safety issue. It also is why the Association has pressured—and continues to pressure—Transport Canada to implement new regulations.

You may have conducted these operations in Canada without incident. However, ALPA believes that we should learn from experience and prevent any SIRO/LAHSO-related accident from ever happening. Enough evidence exists to suggest that if the current trend in SIRO/LAHSO incidents continues, an accident will occur.

Your air safety representatives are working to improve SIRO/LAHSO in Canada. The representatives do not want to prohibit the operations; they want SIRO/LAHSO to be conducted in a consistent manner across the country to a standard that all pilots—in both Canada and the United States—know and can depend on. They want you to know what the other crew is doing. And that simply is not the case today.

Those of you who have consistently refused to fly SIRO/LAHSO have made a difference. You have brought other groups to the table to discuss SIRO/LAHSO—something they were unwilling to do just one year ago. You have shown how the risk of SIRO/LAHSO has grown because proper safeguards are not in place. You have identified airports where not even the current minimum requirements are being respected. Your feedback on SIRO/LAHSO has underscored the seriousness of the current situation.