STATEMENT OF
CAPTAIN DAVID J. HAASE, EXECUTIVE CENTRAL AIR SAFETY CHAIRMAN
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 15, 1997

ONE YEAR AFTER VALUEJET CRASH -
FAA RESPONSE TO HAZMAT AND CARGO FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), representing the safety interests of 46,000 professional airline pilots flying for 44 airlines in the United States and Canada, offers testimony today concerning the areas of: carriage of hazardous materials by air; cargo compartment fire detection and protection; training programs for non-traditional airline employee who routinely handle company materials or COMAT that also classify as hazardous materials; and the safety awareness education of the general public.

As a result of the circumstances surrounding the accidents involving Valuejet Flight 592 and Federal Express (FedEx) Flight 1406, ALPA compiled a Position Paper, dated October 11, 1996 (Attached) to convey our concerns to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on a number of safety concerns involving those accidents. The areas of concern and detailed information contained in the document include: the Carriage of Hazardous Materials; Cargo Compartment Standards; and Aircraft Smoke and Fi re Management. This document has been previously forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for their information and review on October 11, 1996 as well as submitted for consideration at the Valuejet accident public hearing in November 1996. For reference, the cover letter to the NTSB has been placed inside the attached ALPA Position Paper.

Before going further, we understand that the focus of this hearing deals with two areas (Hazmat and cargo compartments) of the three areas of concern discussed in our Position Paper. We will remain focused to those topics, however, we would be remise in not pointing out that there is detailed information concerning the issue of smoke and fire management in an emergency that should not be omitted when considering how to deal with an inflight fire. A fire onboard an aircraft requires that the even t be thoroughly analyzed and plans of action established so that when the emergency occurs, the crew will have sufficient options at their disposal to successfully deal with the event.

Returning to today's main topics, hazardous materials and cargo compartment fire protection, a brief discussion of where we have been is needed to properly understand some of the issues surrounding the events associated with this and other accidents involving hazardous materials, fires, and cargo compartments.

By way of background, ALPA has been involved with issues concerning hazardous materials safety in air transportation as far back as 1958. During those early years there was an effort by the Association to educate the air cargo sector of the industry of the potential hazards associated with the transportation of certain goods and products by air. For the most part, our concerns regarding the packaging, labeling, loading and carriage of hazardous materials were not given the full attention they deserved.

In 1973, an all-cargo B-707 aircraft, Pan Am Flight 160, crashed at Boston's Logan airport killing the entire crew. A fire that started in the cargo compartment of the aircraft eventually rendered the aircraft uncontrollable. The cause of the accident was determined by the NTSB to be improper packaging, labeling and shipping of nitric acid, an oxidizer. As a result of this accident, the NTSB issued four Safety Recommendations (A-73-119 through A-73-122) aimed at aircraft equipment and flight crew proc edures concerning smoke detection, evacuation and smoke identification methods, respectively. Based upon the FAA's response to these recommendations, the NTSB classified them as closed - acceptable.

While ALPA agreed with the NTSB's action, the recommendations did not focus attention on the carriage of hazardous materials. As a result, ALPA increased its involvement in the safe transportation of hazardous materials by air and put into place the S.T.O.P. (safe transportation of people) program. ALPA, under the pilot-in-command authority, prohibited, with few exceptions, the transportation of hazardous materials as cargo on any passenger-carrying or cargo air carrier aircraft.

The ALPA S.T.O.P. program highlighted significant problems with the hazardous materials regulations at that time. Understanding the reason for the difficulties in transporting hazardous materials, the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1978 transferred the authority and responsibility for the hazardous materials regulations of each of the transportation modals to the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). The RSPA and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are ‘sister' agencies under th e DOT umbrella. This consolidation assisted in developing a single set of comprehensive regulations regarding the packaging, labeling, loading and the transport of hazardous materials via all modes of transportation.

In 1980, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) determined that a comprehensive set of regulations governing the international transportation of hazardous materials was needed to provide a seamless blanket of safety where the transport of hazardous materials by air was involved. During the next four years, the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel (DGP) met annually to develop a set of regulations that would carry the weight of an international regulation. In 1984 the ICAO Technical Instructions (ICAO TI) were adopted by ICAO and set forth the international regulation for the transportation of dangerous goods by air.

The regulations, both domestic and international, have been dramatically improved since the early 1970's and have been maintained throughout the 80' and 90's. However, hazardous materials will always provide an additional threat to an aircraft and its occupants when something goes wrong whether inflight or on the ground. This could include, but not be limited to, a cargo compartment fire, a spill or leak of corrosive or flammable liquid, or the release of a toxic gas. The characteristics of a hazardou s material in combination with the confined space of an aircraft cabin or cargo compartment at altitude increases the potential risk over and above that same hazardous material being in an open, well ventilated area on the ground.

As an air transportation overview, ALPA is opposed to the carriage of equipment and components that contain chemical materials that generate oxygen as a function of their designed purpose (chemical oxygen generators) and certain chemical oxidizers (i.e., nitric acid) as cargo by air. The extreme hazards that these items potentially have exceeds accepted levels of risk when transported by air. We were pleased when the RSPA published an interim ruling, then a final rule prohibiting the carriage of oxygen generators on all passenger-carrying aircraft and in Class D cargo compartments of all aircraft. ALPA is also concerned about hazardous materials being shipped by an airline as company materials (COMAT). COMAT is necessary to keep the airline re-supplied of those items used for the continuing airworthiness of their aircraft. COMAT is not transported in accordance with all of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR). Part 175.10(a)(2) makes reference that COMAT items, that are also hazardous materia ls items, must meet the appropriate packaging, labeling, handling, and the Notification to the Pilot-In-Command requirements. Only serviceable aircraft tires do not require certain paperwork items. COMAT appears to be the more significant item involved in the accident involving Valuejet Flight 592. Normal maintenance procedures regarding the actual removal and handling of the oxygen generators may have been followed, however, when those generators were placed into the system for transport, it appears the system broke down. Additional concerns involve both declared and more importantly undeclared dangerous goods.

With reference to declared hazardous materials, we believe that since the combining of the US DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) and the adoption of the ICAO Technical instructions in 1978 and 1984 respectively, there has not been a reported inflight incident involving shipments of hazardous materials that were properly packaged, labeled and loaded on aircraft. This does not, however, remove the potential hazard that certain classes of hazardous materials (i.e., some oxidizers in Class 5, Div ision 5.1) pose to an aircraft structure, especially during a fire.

Although known shipments of hazardous materials are transported safely every day, the threat of a fire and the hazards associated with that fire magnify the potential dangers of a hazardous materials shipment beyond the capability of any cargo compartment currently on any aircraft. The extinguishing agents carried onboard today's aircraft for use in a Class A (passenger), B or C (cargo) compartment are designed to handle what are grouped into a "normal" fire category (i.e., baggage, clothe s, cardboard boxes, paper, etc.). Class D (cargo) & E (cargo aircraft only) do not have requirements for active fire protection. The agents used in a cargo compartment, normally Halon, are acceptable for "normal" fires but are not designed to extinguish or control hazardous materials (oxidizer) fires. Once a fire begins, other items, possibly additional hazardous materials shipments, in the compartment near the fire will become involved which tends to counter the extinguishing or sup pression agent, rendering it useless.

Undeclared hazardous materials is also an area of continuing major concern. Another significant event in hazardous materials transportation by air was an inflight fire on board American Airlines Flight 132, an MD-80 aircraft, on February 3, 1988 while on approach into Nashville, Tennessee. This fire was the result of an undeclared shipment of hazardous materials improperly packaged and unlabeled. It produced a real threat to the safety of all passengers and the aircraft. NTSB investigation revealed t hat a combination of chemicals, including oxidizers, were placed in the Class D cargo compartment of the MD-80. During the flight, the contents of an improperly packaged fiber drum combined and ignited. The ensuing fire was so intense that it deformed the compartment walls and ceiling, and caused the floor in the cabin to buckle and soften.

As a result of that accident, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations concerning hazardous materials and cargo compartments (see Attachment, Appendix A) directed at the following parties: The shipper, the carrier; the regulatory agency - RSPA, the enforcement agency - FAA, and the member-airline organization - the Air Transport Association of America (ATA). A complete synopsis of each recommendation; the action taken; the NTSB recommendation's overall status; and ALPA's comments to the aforementioned ar e discussed in detail in the attached ALPA Position Paper, October 11, 1996. ALPA agrees with the NTSB recommendations.

However, listed below are five NTSB recommendations with the classification as closed - unacceptable action response regarding the FAA action taken, or lack thereof, in the American Airlines case that appear to be directly applicable to the Valuejet accident which occurred eight years later. They are:

  1. A-88-122 - Require fire/smoke detection systems for all Class D cargo Compartments;
  2. A-88-123 - Require a fire extinguishment system for all Class D cargo Compartments;
  3. A-88-125 - Review the certification of all types of cargo compartments to identify any aluminum or other components that fail to meet thermal protection requirements at least equal to cargo compartment liner thermal protection requirements;
  4. A-88-127 - Consider the effects of authorized hazardous materials cargo fires for all types of cargo compartments, and require appropriate safety systems to protect the aircraft and occupants; and
  5. *A-88-124 - Evaluate prohibiting transporting oxidizers in cargo compartments that do not have fire/smoke detection and fire extinguishment systems

*Note: The FAA does not have jurisdiction for changing the Department of Transportation's Hazardous Materials Regulations. This responsibility resides with the RSPA, but the FAA did not encourage the RSPA to take action.

As the result of the Valuejet accident, the NTSB issued the following Recommendations listed below (Attachment, Appendix A). The double underlined text were ALPA comments as of October 11, 1996. The ð symbol are ALPA's comments concerning actions, or lack thereof associated with the recommendation at the writing of this testimony.

The Transporting of Undeclared Hazardous Materials continues to be an area of great concern to all airline pilots throughout the world. Undeclared hazardous materials are so named when they are offered either directly or indirectly to the airline or are contained within the mail as the result of any of the following: 1) the shipper does not know that they are actually shipping a hazardous material and should be following certain regulations, 2) the shipper knows they have a hazardous material bu t do not know they must follow certain regulations, or 3) the shipper knows they have a hazardous material and elect not to follow the proper regulations. Scenarios 1 & 2 are derived from a lack of awareness or knowledge. However, the third is a criminal act and comes from a willful disregard for the regulations and public safety in an effort to avoid the expense of following the regulations (i.e., proper packaging, labels, etc.) or any additional fees that may be imposed by the carrier. These ‘hidde n' or undeclared shipments are often found in cargo but can be found anywhere in the aircraft including carry-on or checked baggage. Cargo sources mentioned in the scenarios above include, but are not limited to, receipt from the public, the U.S. Postal Service, and COMAT. The investigation of the fire onboard FedEx Flight 1406 has identified the possibility of an undeclared shipment of hazardous materials. That shipment should not have been offered nor shipped in the manner it was presented to th e airline.

Hazardous Materials Training

Hazardous materials training requirements for the US DOT HMR are found in 49 CFR Part 172, Subpart H - Training, §172.704, Training Requirements and in Part 6 of the ICAO Technical Instructions. HMR §172.704 stipulate the level of awareness and minimum hazardous materials training required for a HAZMAT employee. Part 6 of the ICAO Technical Instructions lists several employee categories and the level of training required. It has been shown that the emphasis the airline plac es upon the handling of and training for hazardous materials varies depending upon whether that airline is an accept or not accept carrier.

Airlines that are accept carriers are required to provide the extensive function-specific FAA approved, hazardous materials training program to their employees (Cargo acceptance and baggage handling personnel). Airlines that are not accept carriers normally provide a general safety awareness and label identification program. However, in both of these cases, there are no requirements for, nor have the airlines accomplished formal, standardized identification training on what is considered a hazardous m aterial for transportation by air for the airline's Stores (supply) personnel and mechanics. What this indicates is the lack of any formal training to airline employees who may use and/or be involved with items in the daily performance of their jobs that the air mode considers a hazardous material. This lack of safety awareness and/or job specific training establishes and perpetuates a potentially unsafe situation. Formal, standardized training programs need to be developed to assist these employees in i dentifying those materials and components that are considered hazardous materials and how to apply the correct packaging, labeling criteria and loading procedures when these items are transported on their or any airplane. The ATA established a group from their Dangerous Goods Board to review, evaluate, and recommend action that will correct the lack of COMAT training. Also as a result of the FAA's initial evaluation, we are aware that many airlines instituted at least a one-time internal safety review and are developing programs to increase the level of hazardous materials awareness of these categories of employees.

The Valuejet Flight 592 accident investigation has revealed that a combination of poor maintenance practices and a lack of training for Stores personnel and mechanics regarding the packaging, handling, and loading of COMAT that may be classified as a hazardous material (the chemical oxygen generators) may have contributed to the accident. The regulations do not contain a specific requirement for Stores personnel and mechanics to receive training as to the potential hazards of the items commonly used in their work and the hazardous materials relationship to those items presently being carried onboard an aircraft.

As a result of the Valuejet accident, the NTSB Recommendations listed below involving training have been directed to the FAA. The double underlined text were ALPA comments as of October 11, 1996. The ð symbol are ALPA's comments concerning actions, or lack thereof associated with the recommendation at the writing of this testimony.

COMAT

COMAT, for a long time has and continues to be one of the most significant ALPA concerns. There has not been as much awareness and accountability placed upon the potential hazards of COMAT. The Hazardous Materials Regulations specifically, 49 CFR 175.10(a)(2), is often misinterpreted by the reader to conclude that COMAT is not covered by the regulations. To the contrary, except for certain paperwork requirements (serviceable aircraft tires), all COMAT that is identified and classified as a hazardous m aterial must be packaged, labeled, loaded and carried per the hazardous materials regulations. The airlines also misinterpret that COMAT cargo should be different from that offered for carriage by the public. In both instances the regulations are incorrectly interpreted. As a result, many airline personnel are not provided instruction or training to help them identify those common items used by the airline as a hazardous material. This allows an unidentified hazardous material item that should be identi fied to be placed upon the aircraft in a condition that is potentially unsafe. This situation exists at all airlines but is more susceptible to occur at airlines that are not accept carriers. Although Valuejet presented itself to the public as a not accept airline, it moved its COMAT items following common practices found elsewhere within the airline industry.

Activity concerning the COMAT issue has taken place since the Valuejet accident both in government and industry. The RSPA and FAA have taken action to reduce any confusion that may exist in the regulations or in the understanding by individuals. We perceive that a review of the language is being done and, as needed, the RSPA will issue required clarification. The RSPA and FAA have also taken every opportunity to address the subject and point out the correct interpretation. In addition to the governme nt activity, the industry has also been active. The ATA conducted a HAZMAT COMAT conference in Washington, D.C. to increase the awareness the potential misunderstandings and dangers of not identifying COMAT that qualifies as a hazardous material when offered in transportation. Invitations were extended both domestically and internationally to any individual, airline or organization that desired to attend. The turn-out was commendable. ALPA believes that activity such as mentioned above is a start, but s hould not be the last. Employees need to have a quality, standardized initial and recurrent training program. The FAA should provide the guidelines for those programs to the airlines and their inspectors. This will foster uniformity for the safe handling of hazardous materials and other cargo transported on aircraft.

The Pilot's Perspective of COMAT

The flight crews at accept carriers receive hazardous materials training and are generally more familiar with the carriage of hazardous materials as part of their normal airline operation.

The crews at a not accept carrier know they are not to carry hazardous materials. Over the years, the ALPA dangerous goods committee has received many questions from pilots similar to, "How can I carry hazardous materials when we are not authorized to carry these items?" What the flight crews are referring to is the COMAT item they believe to potentially be a hazardous material. The reply they receive is that that material is COMAT and not from the public. However, it must be properly packa ged, labeled and correctly placed upon their aircraft. Since a comprehensive hazardous materials acceptance program is not required at not accept carrier, the correct procedures and preparation may allow hazardous materials COMAT to move transparently through the airline's system. Additionally, the not accept carrier may not be set up to provide the proper information required on a NOTAC (Notice to the Pilot-in-Command) to the pilots telling them if, where and how many hazardous materials items they have onboard. Crew discussions with maintenance about the situation have provided individual, short term resolutions but the underlying problem remains.

Security

The current security system of preventing undeclared hazardous materials from getting on the aircraft involves the airport's passenger security screening program. This program is specifically designed to detect weapons, i.e., guns, bombs, some explosives, etc., that could be transported by passengers in their carry-on baggage. It should be understood that these items are in fact considered to be hazardous materials. The current passenger screening system does not provide training for nor is it equipped to identify hazardous materials in a carry-on bag. The current program is not satisfactory in the area of hazardous materials and needs to be improved to include the detection of hazardous materials items in a carry-on bag. Additionally, there has been little or no identified security (hazardous materials inspection) for checked baggage or other items being processed through the cargo areas. Security measures for identifying an offered checked-bag with the bags owner (passenger) may have assisted in deterring some items being placed onto the aircraft, however, there are no effective procedures to identify "hidden" hazardous materials that may have accidentally or deliberately been placed into the checked-bag or carry-on bags. The security screening program needs to be improved to include the detection of hazardous materials items.

Enforcement

Surveillance

The FAA's current hazardous materials surveillance program is sound. Unfortunately, the FAA presently does not have the inspector force to adequately implement the program and provide hazardous materials surveillance over the airlines, freight forwarders and shippers. This allows for some airlines to not receive as good a review and evaluation as could be achieved. The surveillance and inspections should focus on each of the main components of the airlines involvement with hazardous materials. This i ncludes, but is not limited to: employee training, cargo acceptance (from the public), COMAT, aircraft loading, and required paperwork. At the writing of this paper, Congress voted additional funding for 118 new FAA hazardous materials inspectors. ALPA supports this significant action and the proposed FAA action. The new inspectors will be dedicated to hazardous materials surveillance and inspection. This will allow them to increase their surveillance for not only the airlines but expanding out from th e airport to the freight-forwarders and eventually the shippers. The existing inspector force must divide their time between flight security duties and hazardous materials inspections which negatively impacts their overall effectiveness to provide the kind of hazardous materials surveillance required.

Violation

Education, awareness and training should be stressed, expanded upon and emphasized concerning the potential hazards with all materials and equipment in the workplace, especially those hazards encountered during transportation. Punishment should be the last resort and used as a deterrent. Violations will occur due to misunderstandings of shippers, the accuracy required of paperwork and the deliberate, blatant disregard for the regulations. These infractions need to be studied to improve the effectivene ss of the entire set(s) of hazardous materials regulations.

Adjudication

The FAA Office of the Chief Council (AGC) historically has not done a good job of bringing hazardous materials violation cases to a verdict and closure because resources have not been allocated for these cases. In 1988, after the undeclared hazardous materials accident incident on American Airlines, the FAA AGC made a concerted effort to redirect legal resources to handle the hazardous materials cases. This lasted only a short time and resources were again directed elsewhere. ALPA feels that th e AGC has not been properly staffed to expeditiously handle hazardous materials violations. Congress has recently approved additional funding for 12 more legal personnel. These added resources will hopefully allow for additional case closures and provide a real deterrent to those who violate the law. ALPA is aware that hiring has taken place but does not know to what extent they have met the funding goal of 12.

Conversations with FAA hazardous materials personnel indicate that a problem has also existed when hazardous materials cases have been referred to the Department of Justice for jurisdictional reasons. These cases have not been pursued as they should. Some languish and/or eventually become lost. The impact of swift or quick justice as a deterrent is never achieved.

Oxygen Generators and The Hazardous Materials (HMR) Regulations

Regulations, both domestic and international (HMR or ICAO TI), as they pertain specifically to chemical oxygen generators currently provide a proper shipping name and specific packaging instructions. To properly transport a chemical oxygen generator, an assurance of which chemical(s) substances that are contained within the generator to create the oxygen is required. When this is accomplished, the proper shipping name is used for the same shipment.

Concerning the subject of personal oxygen generators, a serious safety breach exists in both the domestic (49 CFI) and international (ICAO TI) regulations that involve the transport of individual personal oxygen generators. Although there is no United Nations (UN) identification number for these items, they are listed in the hazardous materials regulations as, Oxygen generators, small, for personal use, containing oxidizing substances. The bold print identifies the proper shipping name us ed for transporting these personal oxygen generators as cargo from the manufacturer through distribution to the retail outlet. These generators are classified as a 5.1 material and are required to have an Oxidizer label and must be placed in packaging material that meets the Packing Group (PG) II criteria. General philosophy regarding packing groups is based upon the degree of hazard the material may present during transport. High potential hazards are assigned PG I; medium potential hazards are assigned PG II; and low potential hazards are assigned PG III. Some materials, such as oxidizers have their own PG reference. However, the same philosophy applies. The PG's for 5.1 materials are determined by the relationship of burning times of a standard chemical to the material being classified. The standard chemicals used are: PG I = potassium bromide; PG II = potassium perchlorate; and PG III = ammonium persulphate.

These personal oxygen generators can produce the same amount of heat as the larger aircraft units which are not clearly identified in the regulations. The ICAO DGP does not consider these small generators to be hazardous. As a result, they are listed such that the general provisions of the regulations "do not apply". They must, however, comply with specific criteria noted within 49 CFR 175.10(a)(24). This allows them to be placed into the passenger's checked baggage and then placed into the baggage and cargo compartments of any passenger aircraft worldwide.

The RSPA, recognizing the potential dangers has incorporated the removal of these items from §175.10(a)(24) as part of the proposed rulemaking (Docket HM-224A issued on December 30, 1996) concerning oxidizers. ALPA continues to require the removal of personal oxygen generators and remains in support of banning these personal oxygen generators from being placed on the airplane either in carry-on or checked baggage.

CARGO COMPARTMENT STANDARDS

certification / design

For the past 15 years ALPA has been actively involved with trying to increase the safety standards and criteria for aircraft cargo compartments. This activity has been primarily focused on the Class B, main deck cargo compartment; the Class D cargo compartment; and smoke/fire detection systems and fire protection (extinguishment or containment) systems.

The certification criteria for a Class D aircraft cargo compartment must be improved. The present regulations allow for operation of aircraft in passenger carrying service where quantities of oxygen producing materials can be carried in the Class D cargo compartments that were designed with the intent that no fire detection or suppression was necessary because the compartment was sufficiently rugged and airtight to control a fire by limiting the oxygen available to that fire. Clearly, allowing hazardou s materials that produce their own oxygen is not compatible with the design philosophy developed for these cargo compartments. Our comments that follow will address how the cargo compartment(s) design evolved, and how they need to change.

When discussing fire in a cargo or baggage compartment on the aircraft, ALPA requires a single standard compartment criteria: the present Class C (installed smoke/fire detection and suppression) or better with the addition of a heat trend monitoring. Anything less than this has the potential of an uncontrolled fire causing the lose of an aircraft.

Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) 14 CFR Part 25.857 currently describes five cargo compartment classifications and establishes specific certification criteria for those compartments including fire detection (notification to the pilot at the pilot station) and fire protection (extinguishment or containment of the fire) required in those compartments. Two other certification regulations that are significant when discussing this issue include §25.855 Cargo Or Baggage Compartments (liner flammabil ity criteria) and §25.858 Cargo Compartment Fire Detection Systems. They provide the additional information that is not contained in but referenced by §25.857.

Before a discussion of cargo compartment standards can begin, it is important to identify and describe the different cargo compartments (FAR Part 25.857) that can be found on today's transport category aircraft. The five compartment classifications include -- A, B, C, D, & E and are listed as to their detection and protection status. A detailed description of each classification is contained within our attached Position Paper, however, they are:

Initially the Civil Air Regulations (CAR) provided for certification classifications for three cargo / baggage compartments: A, B, C. Each had detection and protection. Then for an unknown reasons, the Class D compartment was introduced. The FAA had the compartment equipment correct with A, B & C but with the Class D compartment, changed their philosophy and moved away from detection and protection. Continuing with what ALPA believes is a flawed fundamental fire protection principle (Class D) the certification criteria for the Class E cargo compartment, used on all-cargo aircraft, was adopted on April 17, 1959 (Amendment 4b-10, 24 FR. 3153). On November 3, 1964, Part 25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes of the FAR was adopted replacing 4b of the CAR. On August 22, 1968, the FAA published Notice 68-18. Contained within that notice of proposed rulemaking was a proposal to add fire detectors and extinguishers to Class A, B, & C compartments. A commentator to the proposal submitted that this requirement also be extended to Class D cargo compartments. In Amendment 25-23, adopted on April 1, 1970, to Part 25 the FAA stated, "The FAA is not in a position to respond to this comment since the research program referred to in Notice 68-18 is still being evaluated." The FAA missed an opportunity to provide for the highest degree of care and safety when they took no further action on adding fire detectors and extinguishers to Class D compartments.

Reviewing the compartment certification information above, the FAA should have adopted the best criteria for Class D compartments; a built-in fire detection and protection system. It has been 26 years since that proposal, and recent events dictate that it be re-addressed. ALPA's position is to see Class D compartments eliminated, as they are today (notwithstanding the 1000 cubic foot limitation) and all other cargo compartments meet or exceed the current requirements for Class C. Improved smoke and heat detection, with trend monitoring capability for each along with appropriate effective methods of fire protection are also significant areas of importance.

During the past 15-20 years, the certification & continuing airworthiness criteria for these compartments have been improving, specifically the minimum fire penetration resistance criteria for the cargo compartment liner. However, the single most important factor for the continued safe operation of the aircraft with a fire onboard (not located in the engines/nacelles) is providing timely notification to the flight crew regarding smoke and/or fire in the shortest time possible and suppression of that smoke and the controlled suppression of that fire. Anything short of these two requirements places the aircraft with a compartment fire in a situation of considerable potential risk of losing the aircraft and the individuals onboard.

The following chart, Passenger, Aircrew, and Aircraft Survivability , represents the various scenarios that could be expected should an onboard fire occur.

Passenger, Aircrew, and Aircraft Survivability

 

Aircraft

Passengers & Crew

Results
 

INFLIGHT

  

Aircraft

Occupants
1. Fire/smoke continue; renders aircraft unflyable Crew Able to Perform Duties

Lost

Fatal
2. Fire contained - smoke continues; aircraft flyable Crew Incapacitated - Unable to Perform Duties

Lost

Fatal
3. Fire/smoke contained; aircraft flyable Crew Able to Perform Duties

Minimum Damage

Survive
         
 

ON GROUND

      
4. Fire/smoke continue; aircraft destroyed Successful Evacuation of Occupants

Lost

Survive
5. Fire/smoke contained; aircraft not destroyed Failure to Evacuate any/all Occupants

Damaged

Fatal
6. Fire extinguished/smoke eliminated Successful Evacuation of Occupants

Minimum Damage

Survive

A description of each Scenario (keyed to chart above) is provided below:

    1. The fire/smoke is not contained but the crew is able to adequately protect themselves (see and breath) and are able to perform their duties, however, the fire progresses and the aircraft becomes unflyable. The result is the loss of the aircraft and all on board.
    2. The fire/smoke is contained and the aircraft remains flyable, however, the crew was unable to adequately protect themselves (see and breath) thereby becoming incapacitated. The result is the aircraft and all on board are lost.
    3. The fire/smoke is contained and the aircraft remains flyable and the crew is able to perform their duties. The result is minimal damage to the aircraft and a survivable situation for all onboard.
    4. The fire/smoke are not contained, however, a successful evacuation of all on board is performed. The result is the aircraft is may be lost but all on board survive.
    5. The fire/smoke are kept under control, however, the evacuation of passengers and crew is unsuccessful. The result is the aircraft is damaged but all on board are lost.
    6. The fire/smoke are kept under control and the evacuation of passengers and crew is successful. The result is the aircraft sustained minimal damage and all on board survive.

Ideally, Scenarios 3 and 6 are the preferred result. Naturally avoiding such a situation in the first place is the desired goal. However, in the past year, the aviation industry has suffered two events that are clear examples of Scenarios 2 and 4. Both events could have been avoided and can be averted in the future by utilizing present technology.

Fire Detection

Since the Valuejet accident there has been a lot of discussion, announcements, and well intentioned activity. We understand that the FAA is working on rulemaking, however, to date, we are not aware of any public FAA rulemaking (proposed or adopted) or any technical information (aircraft specific) to require the installation of fire detection and protection components in Class D cargo compartments for the airplane fleets operated by today's airlines. The ATA made an announcement with President Clinton t hat they, the airlines, would install fire/smoke detectors in all Class D cargo compartments on their passenger-carrying aircraft. That was over 6-months ago and there is no indication that anything toward making this happen has taken place. The Class D cargo compartment fire scenario remains undetected until it is too late and exposes the aircraft and its occupants to a repeat of the Valuejet scenario. ALPA finds this status unacceptable.

FAR §25.858 describes the criteria for Smoke or Fire detection systems. These systems are designed and expected to notify the pilot at the pilot station (flight deck) concerning the status of any smoke or fire in a passenger, lavatory, cargo or baggage compartment.

ALPA has concluded that the current methods (philosophy) of smoke or fire detection (equipment) are not the best systems available that could be installed on aircraft. ALPA does not like a "light(s) only" system design but prefers a method of temperature (heat) trend monitoring design for every compartment where cargo or baggage are carried. This type of system should be required. ALPA understands that trend monitoring is not applicable with regard to detecting smoke. However, where t here is smoke there is usually fire. Therefore, equipment that can detect a range or ranges of temperatures and display that information to the pilot(s) at their station will provide a more accurate and realistic evaluation of the potential danger of the smoke/fire warning. The most common type is smoke detection. Following the Valuejet accident the industry reported a $360 million dollar cost to the airlines for equipping Class D with protection and detection. They also reported that $170 million of th at cost was due to false warnings; heat trend monitoring capability will dramatically reduce the number of false warning and is therefore cost effective.

One of the issues always discussed at this time is the potential for false warnings. Adding a companion heat trend monitoring system (technology available today) to the current "light(s) only" system increases the smoke/fire detection system reliability. Upon receiving the heat trend information, the flight deck crew can immediately determine if the initial warning light is correct or a malfunction. If the light and heat trend confirm the fire, once the appropriate abnormal or emergency actio n is taken, the pilot will be able to have an almost immediate indication that the action taken is actually working to eliminate or reduce the potential dangers of the fire. A decreasing heat indication observed would be a more accurate indication that the extinguishing agent or ventilation control is working to extinguish or control the fire. This decrease in heat would most likely happen before the light went out under the current "light(s) only" systems.

Positive outcomes to temperature trend monitoring include more effective management of extinguishing agents to combat the fire. Indiscriminate use of limited agent resulting from a light not going out could result in reduced protection over a longer period of time. This is a definite benefit if the flight is not in a position to land immediately, (i.e., extended over water operations, 180 minute ETOPS, or over terrain that is not suitable for a survivable landing).

Fire Protection

ALPA's position in this area is the requirement for an active fire protection system (introduction of agent into the compartment) that extinguishes or maintains the controlled suppression of the fire. Secondary to extinguishing the fire, ALPA encourages the use of a Halon deluge or knock-down and containment method to control the suppression of the fire. Having a temperature trend monitoring system in these instances would be invaluable and would more accurately determine the status of the fire and whe n the next introduction of agent would be required. The next application may be prior to the next scheduled time due to the intensity of the fire. Having a "light(s) only" system will not give the flight deck crew trend information.

Critical Aircraft / Flight Systems Protection

Critical aircraft systems, including flight controls, must be protected from the heat and damage of a fire. No other statement can be made regarding this issue. These systems include, but are not limited to: structure, (i.e., bulkhead, door, or floor warpage); Mechanical, (i.e., cables, pulleys, structure); Hydraulic, (i.e., fluids); Electronic, (i.e., wiring, sensors, switches and other components). Containment of the fire (e.g., not spreading beyond detected areas or increasing in intensity) may not necessarily prevent the heat generated by the fire from affecting any of the systems components mentioned earlier. Heat protection of the aircraft's critical flight systems and structure is accomplished by placing liners onto the aircraft's compartment structure that meet the requirements of FAR §25.855 - Liners. The current regulatory standards for these liners provides the greatest fire protection / flame penetration resistant material.

Liner Integrity

The construction of the liner is important for the liner's integrity. The method used to secure the liner in that compartment to the aircraft's structure can have a major impact upon the integrity of the liner's intended use. Some designs use an aluminum strip between the liner pieces to hold them together. The aluminum strip is then secured to the structure of the aircraft. The design deficiency is when the fire/heat increase above the melting point of the aluminum strip and the liner basically fall s apart. This situation is unsatisfactory because it leaves the compartment and critical flight systems exposed to the fire. Liners utilizing this type of construction should be eliminated. Liner materials may also be fragile after being exposed to fire and therefore may not withstand a substantial impact or shock resulting in the loss of liner integrity. The NTSB identified this type construction in the case of the American Airlines, Flight 132 cargo compartment fire in 1988.

Liner Usage

The topic of compartment liners being "in-place" during any given flight remains an area that ALPA finds troublesome. The concern is mostly with an airline's operation and FAR compliance. FAR §25.855 Cargo or Baggage Compartments requires ceiling and sidewall panel liners in Class B through Class E compartments as described in §25.857. However, §25.855 specifies that only the liners in Class C and D compartments must meet the flammability test requirements of Part III of Appendix F of this Section (Part 25).

As a result, Class B or Class E compartments do not have the same protection as the Class C or D. This is unacceptable. All cargo or baggage compartments should have the same quality of liners - the cargo or the fire does not differentiate due to location.

In addition, ceiling and sidewall liners could be missing from these compartments due to an aircraft configuration change. When this situation is encountered it typically involves the Class B cargo compartment on the main deck of a combination passenger and cargo or "combi" aircraft. The following is a typical scenario:

    1. An aircraft leaves Station A with the Class B main deck cargo compartment in a configuration with all liners (ceiling and sidewall) in place.
    2. At Station B, the cargo load requirements change and the bulkhead is moved reducing the compartment volume. This requires removal of the ceiling and sidewall liners for the area now outside the cargo compartment. This area would normally be occupied by passengers.
    3. The removed liners are taken off the airplane and left at Station B.
    4. At Station C the cargo load requirements changes again. The Class B main deck cargo compartment is returned to the original configuration when it left Station A. However, the liners removed at Station B are now not available to be placed back into their proper position.
    5. The aircraft now continues flying in an improper cargo configuration.

The above is only one scenario. Many variations could be described because the Combi aircraft's main deck cargo compartment's configuration is designed for flexibility allowing the compartment to be changed on any given leg. This practice of not placing ceiling and sidewall liners in their proper position degrades the fire capability of the compartment and is unacceptable and must stop. Without the liners, this leaves critical flight control systems exposed and vulnerable to heat and damage from fire within the compartment. Depending on the situation, there are several solutions available to the operators. Some include the pre-positioning of various liners at Stations known to require configuration changes or carry all removed liners onboard the aircraft to deal with any situation encountered on further flights. Whichever is selected, a solution is necessary.

The Valuejet cargo compartment scenario involves the Class D compartment (no detection; no active protection). We believe the actions of the flight crew would have been different if there was any smoke or fire detection in the compartment where the oxygen generators were loaded. Without the detection devices there was no early notification to the flight crew that a fire existed. In addition, if there was detection, the currently approved systems would have only turned on a light and not provide any heat trend information advising them that the situation was getting worse. Additionally, since this was a Class D compartment (no active fire protection) there was no way for the crew to fight the fire even if / when they received notification or information that the fire was getting worse.

The FedEx scenario is different from Valuejet but is still related to ALPA's concerns. The cargo compartment is Class E (detection; passive protection). The smoke/fire detection system in this situation was better than most. The aircraft had 12 smoke detector positions along the centerline of the compartment ceiling. Initial notification to the crew was provided by three of the detector lights illuminating while the aircraft was inflight. Prior to the emergency landing two more detector position lig hts came on. Although heat trend information was lacking, the compartment was large enough to give the crew an indication that the smoke/fire was getting worse and spreading throughout the compartment. Because the Class E compartment utilizes a passive fire protection system, controlling / limiting the ventilation within the compartment, the crew understood the challenge placed before them -- get the aircraft on the ground before the fire consumed the aircraft. Active fire protection could have reduced the risk potential by controlled suppression and possibly extinguishing the fire thereby increasing the chance of survival.

Class B cargo Compartment

The accident being highlighted during this hearing does not involve a Class B cargo compartment. However, the issue of fire protection for the main deck Class B cargo compartment remains a strong ALPA concern.

In the earlier liner example, reference to a Class B cargo compartment was used instead of a Class E compartment. The reason Class B was used involves separate but related activity to improve aircraft cargo compartments. This activity was prompted by an uncontrolled inflight cargo compartment fire on a South African Airways B-747 in 1987 that resulted in the lose of the aircraft while over water. The FAA quickly conducted an evaluation and investigation involving the ability of a main deck Class B car go compartment to withstand a fire. Finding several deficiencies, the FAA then issued rulemaking action, in the form of an airworthiness directive (AD) to correct those deficiencies by upgrading the Class B cargo compartment standards. Since AD's are only applicable to existing aircraft, the FAA needed to determine if the certification regulations were adequate. This task was assigned to an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) issues group to determine and make recommendation.

By way of background, the FAA has been continuously involved with a regulatory harmonization program with the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). In support of that program, the FAA determined that the best format for this project was the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The ARAC was tasked to discuss the issues and arrive at a solution to correct the potentially unsafe condition that exists with a fire in a Class B cargo compartment. The ARAC's Transport Aircraft and Engines Issu es Group, Class B working group, as early as March 12, 1993 began working on this project. After two and a half years of work on both continents, the group arrived at a consensus on how to incorporate into the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and Joint Aviation Authorities Regulations (JAR) the current Airworthiness Directive (AD), Amendment 39-6301, August 21, 1989, Docket No. 88-NM-80-AD, which is only applicable to certain large transport aircraft (B-707, 727, 737, 747, 757 & 767 series & MD D C8, DC9 (including MD-80 series), DC-10) that have Class B cargo compartments.

It was understood by each individual and organization involved in the Class B working group that our primary task was to review the present (1993) Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), determine if the FAR's were adequate to meet the criteria of the current AD (Docket No. 88-NM-80-AD), and if the FAR's were not, make recommendations as to how the current AD criteria would be incorporated into the certification requirements of FAR Part 25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes. The C lass B working group concluded that the FAR needed to be changed.

After many meetings on both continents, the working group concluded it's work and the completed drafts of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and an associated Advisory Circular (AC) were submitted to the FAA in the Spring of 1995 for completing the FAA legal and economic review prior to the documents being issued for public comment. Since their submission to the FAA, nearly two years ago, neither document has been published for comment and is therefore perceived as having no apparent activity or pr iority. ALPA does not want those proposals to be forgotten in time. New aircraft are being designed at an accelerated rate and requests for FAA/JAA certification continue. The potential unsafe conditions still exist as they were discussed in the original issuance of the NPRM and Final Rule for Docket 88-NM-80-AD, NPRM Docket 89-NM-205-AD, and additional unsafe conditions discovered involving firefighting during the ARAC's document(s) development process. ALPA believes an excessive amount of time has elapsed and that the FAA step up their activity and take regulatory action to incorporate into the certification regulations the documents provided by the Class B working group of ARAC. The NPRM and AC should be published for comment and acted upon quickly.

In a separate but related matter is the re-issuance of the NPRM, Docket No. 89-NM-205-AD, originally issued on September 5, 1990, which dealt with main deck Class B cargo compartments applicable to certain smaller transport aircraft (ATR-42, Falcon Fan Jet, DHC-7, DHC-8, CASA C-212, Canadair CL-600-1A11 & -2A12, EMB-120, and YS-11) used in regional airlines fleets. On June 6, 1994 that NPRM was withdrawn. Although not directly mentioned, this size of airplane would also include the SAAB Models 340A & B and the ATR-72. The FAA indicated, referencing the ARAC Class B working group activities, that "In light of this other on-going rulemaking activity, the FAA hereby withdraws the proposed AD." The document went on to say, "Withdrawal of this notice of proposed rulemaking constitutes only such action, and does not preclude the agency from issuing another notice in the future..."

It should be stressed again that the ARAC was tasked with incorporating Docket No. 88-NM-80-AD into the aircraft certification section of the FAR's and should not be confused with correcting the potentially unsafe condition present in the current fleets. The current small transport category aircraft cargo compartments must be upgraded or modified to meet the intent prescribed in the withdrawn proposed rule. The actions cited by the FAA and specified in the summary of 89-NM-205-AD w ere stated as follows: "This condition, if not corrected, could result in an uncontrolled cargo fire that could cause extensive damage to the systems and structure of the airplane."

The ARAC process worked. Industry and government (U.S. and international) reached a consensus and the FAA should not wait for another inflight cargo compartment fire to make the appropriate changes. The FAA should publish, as quickly as possible, for public comment the NPRM and Draft AC work of the ARAC and re-issue the withdrawn FAA NPRM (Docket No. 89-NM-205-AD) covering smaller transport aircraft, including those additional aircraft not originally mentioned in the NPRM.

SUMMARY

Based upon the above, the Air Line Pilots Association remains convinced that serious deficiencies still exist involving the carriage of hazardous materials by air; cargo compartment fire detection and protection; training programs for non-traditional airline employee who routinely handle company materials or COMAT that also classify as hazardous materials; and the safety awareness education of the general public. The aviation community has experienced several serious events. Improvements in all of the specific areas mentioned herein could have minimized or eliminated the potential risk of such events from occurring.

It is envisioned that our testimony will provide sufficient background information to assist the committee in providing guidance to the FAA and RSPA in the issuance of rulemaking that will preclude events such as have been discussed in the preceding pages. ALPA remains committed to advancing the criteria and requirements in the above mentioned areas.

The issues and recommendations discussed here are applicable to pilots who fly domestically and internationally. They reflect the efforts of the Air Line Pilots Association over the past 30 years as well as the concerns of pilots worldwide.

For these reasons, ALPA offers the following safety recommendations.

Carriage of hazardous materials

  1. RSPA shall prohibit the carriage, by air, of certain volatile and/or unstable chemical oxidizers (e.g., nitric acid) that present an undue risk from being placed in compartments that do not have an installed smoke/fire detection and fire protection system.
  2. FAA shall require that formal, standardized training programs be developed for airline employees (Stores and Maintenance) in identifying components and materials that are considered to be hazardous materials and which of those materials are or are not authorized to be placed on aircraft. This program shall include procedures of how to apply the correct packaging and labeling criteria as well as loading procedures when hazardous materials items are transported on their or any airplane.
  3. FAA shall improve security screening to include the identification, detection and removal of improper hazardous materials items in carry-on baggage.
  4. FAA shall improve security screening to include hazardous materials inspections for checked baggage and/or other items being processed through cargo areas to prevent undeclared hazardous materials from getting on the aircraft.
  5. RSPA shall remove from the list of items that the regulations "do not apply" to (§175.10 Exceptions) the authorization for personal oxygen generators (§175.10(a)(24)) mandating that these units be properly declared, packaged, labeled and loaded when transported on board airplanes either as cargo or in checked baggage.

Cargo compartments

  1. FAA shall require that all cargo or baggage compartments meet or exceed the current requirements for Class C (installed smoke/fire detection and fire protection systems).
  2. FAA shall require that improved smoke and heat detection, with temperature (heat) trend monitoring capability be installed in all cargo or baggage compartments.
  3. FAA shall require installed smoke/fire detection and fire extinguishment systems in Class D compartments.
  4. FAA shall require that active fire protection systems (introduction of an agent into the compartment) is used within all cargo or baggage compartments.
  5. FAA shall require the use of a deluge or knock-down and containment method (current agent used is Halon) to control and/or extinguish the fire.
  6. FAA shall enforce cargo compartment configuration compliance with §25.855, (e.g., ceiling and sidewall liners) onboard the aircraft to meet any configuration change encountered on further flights.

Mr. Chairman, ALPA appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and I would be pleased to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.

Attachment:

A Position Paper: Hazardous Materials; Cargo / Baggage Compartments; Smoke / Fire Management, October 11, 1996, Engineering and Air Safety Department, Air Line Pilots Association, International, Herndon, VA