Central Air Safety Committee

Just days before the ALPA embargo was to begin the FAA and ATA agreed with us that some major modifications needed to be made to the FAA’s Land and Hold Short Operation (LAHSO). That agreement eliminated the need for the embargo.

On March 12, 1999, new criteria will be used for all LASHOs. Some of the changes include:

No wet runway LAHSO.

No night LAHSO unless in-pavement lighting is installed.

Only air carrier aircraft (FAR Part 121) involved.

Distances computed by using agreed values (the same as Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operation (SIRO).

Operation specifications changed and approved by FAA.

Addition of a specific page in our Route Manual detailing the LASHO. (Specific Aircraft type and rejected landing information must be included.)

In the near future, more information will be forthcoming from the LAHSO Project Team about additional requirements. These include improvements in vertical guidance to the affected runways.

We all need to carefully read this important safety information when it arrives at our homes.

When LAHSO began ALPA expressed our concerns. After several incidents LASHO required further evaluation. In July 1997, after the FAA proposed relaxing certain conditions for LASHO, we realized that we had to act. We have now dramatically improved the safety of LAHSO. The success of the LAHSO Project Team exemplified what we can do when necessary.

Precision Runway Monitoring Approach

This year in our simulators and ground schools we are being introduced to Precision Runway Monitored (PRM) approaches. This is another attempt to enhance an airport’s capacity without building another runway. The idea is relatively simple:

• Use modern, quick-updating radar and reduce the distance requirement between runways for parallel ILS approaches.

• Have a special controller monitoring the aircraft so that if one starts to get to close to the other, special instructions can be given to ensure separation is maintained.

The FAA did studies in Memphis, Raleigh-Durham, and Minneapolis. As expected, modifications and improvements were made to the original plan. Slowly, the program matured to a state where they could use actual airplanes in good weather. The traffic planners said that there would be a significant improvement in traffic flow per hour.

The first test using actual aircraft began, but had to be discontinued within a month. Far too many aircraft entered the No Transgression Zone (NTZ)—a two thousand foot wide block of airspace into which no aircraft is permitted. Something was obviously wrong. Many meetings ensued. The result was improvements in the localizer signal to Category II requirements. This stopped the wandering that a less precise localizer can produce at ten miles from the runway threshold.

In recent months, another test was initiated. This time the results were better. As the FAA gained experience with PRM approaches, the temptation to expand this technology intensified. Other airports wanted the increase in traffic that the PRM program promised. Yet, problems remained unresolved. ALPA has been a part of PRM . . .

ALPA has been a part of PRM from the beginning. We have had experts involved with the FAA during the years of learning that PRM required. We have made recommendations that resulted in major improvements. The question arose: Should the Minneapolis program be expanded?

ALPA National’s Air Traffic Control (ATC) Committee believes that important issues remain unresolved. Until agreement can be reached, we should not expand the PRM program.

Some of the major issues include:

The use of TCAS. The ATC committee believes TCAS should be used in the Traffic Alert and Resolution Advisory (TA/RA) mode.

A national standard for all PRM approaches. The ATC Committee believes that one standard should apply nationwide and not have individual programs at each airport.

Training for all participants. The ATC Committee believes that simulator training should be required for any flight crew-member before they fly a PRM approach.

The use of a descent in a "breakout" maneuver. This is one of the most difficult issues between air traffic controllers and the ATC Committee. The need for this type of maneuver is unlikely, but there is a risk associated with it. Therefore, the ATC Committee believes that a descending breakout should not be used.

These issues are difficult and complex. There may or may not be solutions to the questions.

The future of the PRM program is uncertain. We recognize the benefit of increased capacity at our hub airports. However, we must ensure that any increase in capacity does not come at the expense of safety. Until we can assure ourselves that there is no degradation in
the safety of our passengers and fellow crew-members we must continue to press the issues.

Like LASHO, this program requires our attention. It is important that we carefully read all material about PRM when it is released. Every ALPA Central Air Safety Committee is involved. We will provide undated information as soon as possible. So stay tuned.